This paper focuses on the empirical analysis of wage inequality and segregation between immigrants and natives in the workplace. Our approach accounts for the interaction between skill level and immigration status (work permit). First, we calculate exposure rates in order to analyze segregation at the firm level along these two dimensions. Second, we examine the role of segregation in the explanation of wage inequality between different skill-nationality groups. We use data from the Swiss Wage Structure Survey 2002 which records individual wages among a very large sample of establishments in all industries, covering approximately 42'000 firms and 1 million workers. Our results show that interfirm segregation is particularly pronounced for unskilled foreign workers and for recently arrived, highly skilled foreigners. The former earn lower wages than equally skilled Swiss workers and the latter are paid higher wages than highly skilled Swiss workers. In both cases, interfirm segregation explains almost the entire wage differential.
Introduction
In many European countries, immigration policy has undergone major changes in recent years. Even traditional guest-worker countries, such as Germany or Switzerland, try to attract more highly skilled immigrants and to limit the arrival of unskilled workers. While this policy change has been relatively successful in Switzerland, an important number of unskilled workers continue to arrive because of the inertia produced by migration laws (e.g family reunion). As a result, the group of recently arrived immigrants is highly heterogeneous with respect to skill.
What is the situation of this new generation of immigrants in the labor market? In the past, several empirical studies documented the fact that immigrant workers are, on average, paid lower wages than natives. Moreover, it has often been observed that unskilled immigrants hold jobs that native workers would not accept. Does this still hold true with the recent changes in immigration policy?
This paper seeks to answer these questions by analyzing the determinants of wage inequality between natives and immigrants. In our search for determinants of wage inequality, we focus on the role of segregation at the firm level between natives and immigrants and explore the connection between segregation and wage inequality. In order to take the skill heterogeneity of the immigrant population into account, we analyze segregation as a two-dimensional phenomenon, considering the dimensions of skill and nationality (or type of work permit). The interaction between these two dimensions turns out to be crucial for the explanation of wage inequality.
To our knowledge, there has been very little research on the link between segregation and the native / immigrant wage gap. Liu et al. (2004) analyze the link between occupational segregation and wage inequality between immigrants and natives in Hong Kong, using Brown et al.'s (1980) methodology. Several other papers focus on the related issue of segregation between ethnic groups. Neuman and Silber (1996) explore the role of occupational segregation in the wage differential between the two main ethnic groups in Israel. They expand Oaxaca's (1973) decomposition method in order to account also for occupational segregation. Hirsch and Schumacher (1992) introduce a racial density variable in Mincer-type wage equations and evaluate its contribution to the racial wage gap. It should be noted that these papers define segregation at the occupational level (Hirsch and Schumacher define segregation within industry-occupation-region cells).
Our approach to segregation is closer to Carrington and Troske (1998) who discuss segregation between black and white workers at the firm level. The concept of interfirm segregation is interesting as it captures the actual interactions between different population groups in the workplace. When decomposing the black/white wage gap, these authors find that interfirm segregation explains only a small share of the wage gap. Our paper draws also on the approach adopted by Groshen (1991) and Bayard et al. (2003) in order to determine the contribution of segregation to the explanation of the male/female wage gap. In her decomposition procedure, Groshen uses a segregation index which turns out to be based on male/female exposure rates.
Our paper generalizes this approach to the multi-group case by defining segregation with respect to the two dimensions of nationality and skill. Exposure rates are particularly well suited for such a generalization since they have a natural interpretation in the multi-group case. The use of multi-group exposure rates is common in studies of neighborhood segregation (e.g., Bayer et al., 2003) but, to our knowledge, they have never been used in the context of interfirm segregation.
Although exposure rates can be aggregated into a single-valued segregation index (James, 1986) , the link between segregation and wage inequality can be modeled in a more satisfactory way by using the full information on exposure rates by skill/nationality groups. 1 This is crucial if one wants to model the link between segregation and wage inequality at both ends of the skill distribution. We use data from the Swiss Wage Structure Survey 2002 which records individual wages among a very large sample of establishments in all industries, covering approximately 42'000 firms and 1 million workers.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section summarizes the main features of Swiss migration policy and presents the database. Section 3 gives a brief account of the approach we use in a simplified framework where the skill and nationality dimensions are characterized by two alternatives each (skilled / unskilled, Swiss / foreign). Some interesting results can already be derived in this framework. The two following sections generalize the setting to four skill levels and five categories of nationality / work permit. The patterns of segmentation along these two dimensions are discussed in Section 4 and the link between segregation and wage inequality is analyzed in Section 5. The last Section concludes.
Institutional context and data
Under the traditional guest-worker policy applied by the Swiss government after World War II, unskilled workers were actively recruited in South European countries. Although active recruitment came to a halt in the 1970s, a temporary migration regime subsisted until the 1990s. This policy had important consequences for the skill composition of the permanent population in Switzerland until today. Many immigrants were first granted a seasonal work permit, allowing them to work in a limited number of sectors (construction, tourism, agriculture). Because of these severe restrictions, this policy attracted mainly unskilled workers. After several years of uninterrupted seasonal work, these workers were entitled to a more permanent, annually renewable, work permit without sectoral restrictions.
More recently, the Swiss government has reoriented its policy by negotiating bilateral agreements on the free movement of persons between the European Union and Switzerland. The main features of the Swiss migration policy are the following. Foreigners are classified into four main categories which entail different economic rights:
1. seasonal workers and short-term workers : "permit A"; 2. annual workers : "permit B"; 3. settled workers : "permit C"; 4. cross-border workers : "permit G".
The work permit for seasonal workers allows them to stay no more than nine months in Switzerland before they have to leave the country. Seasonal workers are constrained to work in industries characterized by seasonal activities (i.e. mainly construction, tourism and agriculture) and are not free to move to another canton. Seasonal workers are mainly low skilled. This type of permit was abolished in June 2002 with the entry into force of the bilateral agreements with the European Union (EU). Nowadays, Swiss authorities issue more often short-term work permits (duration less than 12 months), particularly for skilled workers. The quotas for short-term workers (and for seasonal workers) are set at both the cantonal and federal levels, depending on the size and economic situation of the canton. It is important to note that, after four consecutive years of seasonal work in Switzerland, seasonal workers could apply for an annual permit.
Annual permits have to be renewed every year but, since 1993, the holders of such permits are no longer limited in their mobility between cantons. The population possessing an annual permit is very heterogeneous. Many of these workers are highly skilled but a significant number of mostly unskilled workers have obtained their annual permit by "upgrading" a seasonal permit. Finally, settlement permits are delivered to workers who have stayed in Switzerland for several years (citizens of EU, EFTA, US and Canada: 5 years; other countries: 10 years). This category of workers can therefore be characterized as "old" immigrants. Settled workers have the same economic rights as the Swiss and are totally free to move from one canton to another.
Finally, cross-border workers must live close to the Swiss border and have to return home every day. Obviously, this population of workers has significantly grown since the signing of the bilateral agreements with the EU. The number of cross-border work permits is not limited by the federal legislation. Each canton bordering a frontier can issue such authorizations.
Turn now to the database we use in the analysis of segregation and wage inequality. The Swiss Wage Structure Survey (SWSS) was launched in 1994 by the Federal Office of Statistics (OFS). The survey is repeated every two years. The SWSS records individual wages within a sample of establishments of all industries (including the public sector at the federal level exclusively). The sampling has two levels: at the first level, production units are sampled; and at the second level, individuals employed at these sampled units are also sampled. Concerning production units, the universe to be sampled includes all establishments with at least two employees. The sampling rate is stratified according to the 2-digit sector classification and the size of the largest plant of a given firm. The sampling structure for the employees is as follows: exhaustive in small units (less than 20 employees); half of the employees in firms with 20 to 49 employees and one sixth of the employees in firms with at least 50 employees. In 2002, almost 1.1 mio of employees from 42'000 firms were included, representing almost 40% of the workforce in Switzerland.
The universe of firms has been changed since the 1996 survey; in 1994, the register of firms and establishments was used but, since 1996, the universe has been a new database of firms. Moreover, individuals cannot be identified in the intervening two years between surveys. Thus, at this stage, we can directly identify firms between two-year periods but we cannot identify the individual fixed effects on wage dispersion Annual as well as October remuneration is recorded. Annual remuneration can be broken down into total wage, overtime pay (and others payments for shift-work, nightwork, etc.), a 13th and possibly the 14th month's salary and annual bonuses. Information on the method of pay (time-rate, piece-rate, etc.) and the form of pay (monthly or hourly) is available. There is also information on the fraction of the October remuneration paid out for social insurances, but not the contribution paid by the employer. It is thus possible to infer the net annual remuneration (before tax) for each worker.
Furthermore, we know for each worker whether he or she is Swiss or not and, if not, the type of work permit he or she holds, his or her age, his or her level of seniority in the firm, educational level and marital status and the number of "normal" hours he or she normally puts into the job 2 . In addition, the level of skill required by the job (4 positions), hereafter the "skill", as well as a 24-position variable defining the "activity domain" of the job are given. Finally, the information about the firm comprises: 2-and 4-digit industry codes, total employment, post code and the existence or not of a branch agreement (referred to below as a collective agreement) or of a firm-level agreement.
Our final sample was selected as follows. We use the SWSS data for the most recent year available (2002) . We exclude public-sector firms and firms employing less than 10 workers. We also exclude workers under the age of 20 or over the legal retirement age for men (i.e. 65 years). In the end, once the observations for which information was missing on the variables of interest were excluded, our sample contains 18'449 firms and 913'785 workers. Descriptive statistics of main variables are shown in Table 1 . The wage variable we use in the regressions is a full-time equivalent wage rate: it is linearly standardized at 40 hours per week.
Overview of the decomposition method
In order to analyze the link between segregation at the firm level and wage inequality, we distinguish population groups along two dimensions: skill and nationality. The twodimensional nature of the analysis enables us to account for the heterogeneity characterizing the group of foreign workers in Switzerland. In this section, we introduce our decomposition method by focusing on the simplified "two-by-two" case where each dimension is characterized by only two alternatives (skilled -unskilled; Swiss -foreign). In the following sections, the method will be expanded to four skill groups and five nationality groups.
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In contrast to other studies (Groshen, 1991; Bayard et al., 2003) we are considering segregation as a multigroup phenomenon. In the "two-by-two" case presented in this section, population can be divided into four groups: Swiss skilled, Swiss unskilled, foreign skilled and foreign unskilled workers. Several indices of multigroup segregation have been proposed in the literature (see an overview of these measures in Reardon and Firebaugh, 2002 ). As we focus on the link between segregation and wage inequality, the use of a single-valued index would, however, be too reductionist in our context.
Instead, we prefer to measure segregation by using a set of "exposure rates" at the firm level. Exposure rates give an intuitive and simple description of the work environment of each individual worker: they measure, from the viewpoint of a representative member of a group, the average composition of his firm's workforce. By using a set of exposure rates rather than a single-valued index, the link between segregation and wage inequality can be specified in a much more flexible way.
Consider first the measurement of segregation. The skill dimension is captured by a dummy variable s ij which takes the value one if individual i in firm j is skilled, and zero otherwise. As to nationality, f ij is a dummy variable indicating whether individual i in firm j is a foreigner. The composition of firm j's workforce in terms of skill and nationality can be described by the following variables:
, the fraction of foreigners in firm j's workforce;
, the fraction of skilled workers in firm j's workforce;
, the fraction of skilled foreigners in firm j's workforce; where
and n j denotes firm j's total workforce. For later use, we define also the total number of foreign (skilled; foreign skilled) workers:
, and
Exposure rates can now be defined on the basis of these compositional variables. The exposure rate e m,n measures, in the context of firms, the average exposure of a worker of group m to workers belonging to group n. Exposure rates are usually defined along a single dimension (e.g. sex, race, nationality, skill). As an illustrative example, we first calculate exposure rates with respect to nationality (Swiss or foreign): 
where the share of foreign workers in population, n f / , can be interpreted as the expected exposure of Swiss workers to foreigners if there were perfect integration. In the case of two population groups, an equivalent definition of the segregation index is based on the "overexposure" to the own group: Table 2 illustrates the extent of firm-level segregation in Switzerland with respect to nationality. The work environment of Swiss workers is composed, on average, by 77.2 percent Swiss workers; the remaining 22.8 percent are foreign workers. As the share of Swiss workers in total working population is 70.0 percent, the "over-exposure" of Swiss workers to workers of their own nationality is 7.2 percent and the value of the segregation index is 0.239.
It is instructive to compare these values with segregation measured along the skill dimension. The segregation index calculated from exposure rates in Table 3 indicates that segregation is more pronounced along the skill dimension (0.314) than according to the criterion of nationality (0.239). This analysis can be refined by interacting the skill dimension with the nationality dimension. Table 4 presents exposure rates for the resulting four population groups. 4 James (1986) proposed different generalizations of the segregation index defined in
(1) and (2) to the multigroup case. In table 4, we report the index which measures the segregation of one group from all others; it is a straightforward generalization of (2) to the case of several groups. This index reveals that segregation is particularly pronounced for the group of unskilled foreigners, as well as for skilled Swiss workers.
Moreover, it seems that unskilled workers tend to be located in the same firms even if they have different nationalities. Indeed, the exposure rate of unskilled Swiss workers to unskilled foreign workers (14.9 percent) is greater than the latter's share in total population (12.0 percent) and the reciprocal exposure rate (16.8 percent) is also greater than the population share of unskilled Swiss workers (13.5 percent).
Turn now to the determination of wages and their link with segregation. We use a wage equation which includes the above defined dummy variables at the individual level and the compositional variables at the firm level:
where x i is a vector of individual characteristics (age, age squared, dummy female, dummy never married and interaction terms). It should be emphasized that this equation allows for the possibility that Swiss and foreign workers face different returns to skill since the individual dummy variables include an interaction term, ij f ij s . By contrast, the parameters applying to individual demographic characteristics and firm composition variables are constrained to be identical for all groups (this assumption is relaxed in the extensions of the model). In order to illustrate our decomposition method in the simple two-by-two case, we estimate equation (3) by OLS. One might be worried by the fact that omitted firm-level variables could induce biased estimates of the individual coefficients α i . It can be shown that by including the means by firm of all three individual dummy variables, the α i are estimated without bias (see Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004, p. 52) .
The difference between the average log-wages of two groups m and n can be decomposed as follows: 5 Note that the average residual is zero for all four population groups as the estimation method is OLS and the model contains dummy variables for all population groups. Equation (4) can be interpreted as an extended Oaxaca (1973) decomposition, with the coefficients on demographic variables (but not on skill) constrained to be identical for all groups.
The first term on the right hand side of (4) includes the individual effects of nationality and skill. In general, this term includes two different effects which are familiar from the traditional Oaxaca decomposition: 6 (i) the estimated effect of the difference in average skill between the two groups; (ii) the unexplained part of the wage difference which reflects differences in returns to skill and might be due to discrimination. 7 . One or the other of these effects might be zero, depending on which groups are compared. For example, if unskilled Swiss workers are compared with unskilled foreigners, the first term on the right hand side of (4) reduces to 1 α − which can be interpreted as individual wage discrimination. As Table 5 makes clear, individual discrimination represents more than half of the mean wage differential (which is equal to 9 percent). If the wage comparison is carried out for skilled workers, the first term on the right hand side of (4) is equal to
. In this case, discrimination explains more than 100 percent of the wage difference between Swiss and foreign skilled workers (equal to 5.4 percent).
The interpretation of the first term on the right hand side of (4) is different if two groups of the same nationality are compared. For example, if mean wages of skilled and unskilled workers of Swiss nationality are compared, the first term on the right hand side of (4) is equal to 2 α , capturing the contribution of skill differences (more than 70 percent) to the mean logwage differential of 36.8 percent. The preceding makes clear that the first term on the right hand side of (4) captures both the "endowment" and the "discrimination" components of the traditional Oaxaca decomposition if the mean wages of two groups of different skill and nationality composition are compared. As Table 5 shows, the endowment effect explains 38 percent and the discrimination component 36 percent of the mean log-wage differential between Swiss and foreign workers.
The impact of firm-level segregation on wage differences is captured by the second term on the right hand side of (4). This term is a weighted sum of the differences in exposure rates of the two groups being compared (i.e. the rows in Table 4 ). The estimated weights p b are linear combinations of the coefficients k βˆ in the wage regression and are reported in the last row of 6 In general, the distinction between the two first effects can only be made explicit if a reference group is chosen. For an extensive discussion of this issue see Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) . Here we choose the majority group (Swiss workers) as the reference unless otherwise indicated. 7 The unexplained part of the wage difference may also capture group differences in unobserved characteristics. In the context of immigration, the discrimination term might in particular reflect unobserved differences in education quality. In our setting, this bias is likely to be rather small since skill is measured by a variable describing the required skill level for the job. Table 4 . 8 According to these estimates, workers in firms with a high share of foreign unskilled workers are highly disadvantaged in terms of wages, especially in comparison to individuals working in firms with a high share of skilled foreign workers. The exposure rates given in the last column of Table 4 indicate that foreign unskilled workers are likely to experience the most important wage losses due to their work environment. Indeed, the exposure rate of unskilled foreign workers to workers of their own group is 22 percentage points higher than their share in population. For this group of workers, segregation at the firm level translates (with an estimated foreign unskilled b , equal to -0.342) into a wage loss of more than 7 percentage points. This simple calculation is confirmed by the decomposition given in Table 5 . Of the total wage differential between Swiss and foreign unskilled workers, amounting to 9 percent, more than 80 percent can be explained by firm-level segregation.
The contribution of segregation to the wage differential between skilled Swiss and skilled foreign workers turns out to be much smaller: less than one fifth of the 5.4 percent wage differential is explained by segregation. This result should, however, be taken with a grain of salt because the category of "skilled" workers is an aggregate of three different skill levels. As the more detailed analysis carried out in the next section will make clear, segregation explains an important fraction of wage differentials between equally skilled Swiss and foreign workers.
When evaluating wage differentials by skill (see Table 6 ), the contribution of segregation seems to be rather modest in relative terms, especially for Swiss workers.
Segregation by skill and by work permit
In this section we apply the approach outlined in Section 3 to a more detailed breakdown of skill levels and of the immigration status (work permits). For each employee, employers were asked to define the skill level required for the job. The four skill levels are defined as follows :
• skill 1: job involving the most demanding and most difficult tasks ; • skill 2: job requiring independent and qualified work ; • skill 3: job requiring specialized professional knowledge ; • skill 4: job involving simple and repetitive tasks.
Our database does not provide any information on the workers' nationality. However, we are able to distinguish foreign workers by work permit. This distinction enables us to analyze the impact of different types of migration. Foreigners with seasonal or short-term permits (permit 8 Because of the linear dependence of exposure rates, these coefficients must be normalized. Setting A) can be considered as temporary migrants. In contrast, holders of settlement permits (permit C) can be seen as permanent immigrants because these permits are granted only after five or ten years of uninterrupted stay in Switzerland. Annual permits (permit B) are held by recently arrived immigrants; this category might include both temporary and permanent immigrants. The category of cross-border workers (permit G) differs from the others by the fact that these workers are hired only in regions close to the border. These permits are handled by authorities in a quite flexible way.
Firm-level segregation is particularly strong for cross-border workers and seasonal/short-term permits (see segregation indicators in Table 7 ). Although the skill profile of cross-border workers is similar to the skill structure of Swiss workers (see Table 1 ), there is a large fraction of firms (70 percent) who do not hire any of these workers, obviously for geographical reasons. Seasonal and short-term workers are hired predominantly in certain sectors, implying that more than 80 percent of firms do not employ any of these, largely unskilled, workers. Settled workers have a similar skill profile, but they are distributed much more evenly among firms: only 22.6 percent of firms do not employ any of them. The James (1986) index of segregation is even lower for annual permits than for settlement permits. This is probably due to the fact that both ends of the skill distribution are well represented in this category of recently arrived immigrants who occupy jobs in very different types of firms.
The heterogeneity of the category of annual permits -including temporary and permanent immigrants -is also reflected by the exposure rates to other foreign worker categories. In particular, the exposure rate of annual workers to seasonal and short-term workers (3.9 percent), on the one hand, and to settled workers (21.1 percent), on the other hand, is higher than the average population share of the two latter groups. Turning to segregation by skill (see Table 8 ), a similar close link exists between the two most highly skilled population groups. More generally, the degree of segregation, as measured by James' (1986) index, seems to diminish with skill.
Before turning to the analysis of the impact of firm-level segregation on wage inequality, it is useful to take a closer look at the interaction between segregation by skill and by work permit. Here the approach proposed by Bayer et al. (2003) turns out to be useful. They notice that exposure rates can be calculated by regressing the fraction p j θ of workers of type p in a worker's firm on individual dummy variables characterizing the worker's type. For example, the first column of Table 7 can be obtained by regressing the fraction of Swiss workers in an individual's firm on a set of dummy variables characterizing nationality and work permits (omitting the constant term). Besides being a convenient way of calculating standard errors, this method can be usefully extended by including other explanatory variables in the regression. 9 We use this approach to explore first the influence of skill on segregation by nationality or work permit. Table 9 shows the marginal impact of skill on the exposure of workers of a certain nationality (work permit) to other workers of the same nationality (work permit).
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The first column of Table 9 indicates that unskilled Swiss individuals work in firms with 3.2 percentage points less Swiss workers than Swiss workers with specialized professional knowledge ("skill 3", the reference in the regression). For Swiss workers, the other skill categories do not have a marked influence on the exposure rates to other Swiss workers. For foreign workers, the effect of skill on segregation is much more pronounced. In the case of settled workers and cross-border workers, a clear pattern emerges: the exposure of these workers to other workers of their group is strongly decreasing with skill. For highly skilled foreigners with a settlement permit, the exposure to other settled foreign workers is 11.6 percentage points lower than for unskilled foreign workers with a settlement permit. Recently arrived immigrants (with annual permits) show a rather different pattern: the highest exposure rates to workers of their own type are measured at both extremes of the skill distribution. In other words, not only unskilled foreigners tend to work predominantly with other foreigners, but also highly skilled immigrants (with annual permits) tend to work with other foreigners.
The analysis can be refined by taking the opposite perspective, analyzing the influence of work permits on segregation by skill (see Table 10 ). Segregation by skill seems to be more pronounced for foreign workers, especially for recently arrived immigrants (holding annual or short-term permits). This holds true both for highly skilled and unskilled workers, but not for jobs requiring specialized professional knowledge (Skill 3) where most Swiss workers are located. Unskilled foreign workers holding an annual permit work in firms with 8.4 percentage points more unskilled workers than unskilled Swiss workers (the reference category). Conversely, the work environment of highly skilled foreign workers with an annual permit is characterized by a 7.5 percentage points greater share of highly skilled workers than the work environment of highly skilled Swiss workers.
These results point to the existence of two very different types of firms employing mostly foreign workers. On the one hand, some firms hire predominantly unskilled foreign workers, on the other hand, there are firms that employ a great share of highly skilled foreign workers who have been recruited recently, possibly as a consequence of the bilateral agreements with the EU. Whether these firms pay different wages than other firms is the question we turn to now.
Wage inequality and segregation
In order to explore the link between segregation and wage inequality, we estimate an expanded version of wage equation (3). We replace the three individual dummy variables by seven dummy variables describing the four levels of skill and the five categories of nationality/ work permit. Possible links between skill and nationality are captured by a full set of interaction dummies. Similarly, the three variables describing the composition of the workforce are replaced by share variables capturing the structure of each firm's workforce in terms of all skills and work permits. Again, a full set of interaction variables is added to the equation. Moreover, we add sectoral dummy variables in order to account for unobserved factors at the sector level. Together with the same set of demographic variables as in the "twoby-two" case, this forms our basic wage equation.
In the estimation of the wage equation, there are two problems we have to confront. First, it is not obvious that our simple parametric characterization of workforce composition captures all relevant aspects of segregation between natives and immigrant workers. The results of our decomposition should not depend on this particular specification of the model. Second, the variables characterizing the composition of the workforce are measured with error in the larger firms where the survey is not exhaustive. It is well known that this measurement error tends to bias the estimated coefficients of the entire regression. In a second step, we regress the fixed firm effects on the workforce composition variables and on dummy variables capturing sectors two-digit level.
We address these two problems by estimating the wage equation in two steps. In the first step, we regress the log-wage on individual variables and firm dummies. The use of firm fixed effects can be interpreted as a non parametric specification of firm-level segregation. This procedure addresses also the problem of measurement error since the variables of workforce composition are not part of equation used in the first step. In a second step, we regress the fixed firm effects on the workforce composition variables and on dummy variables capturing sectors at the two-digit level.
As every firm belongs to one sector, there is a problem of collinearity between our firm composition variables and sectoral dummies. In order to avoid that part of the firm composition effects are captured by the sectoral dummy variables in our wage regression, we decompose the sectoral dummies into two components: a first component that can be explained by firm composition variables and a second component which is orthogonal to the firm composition variables. It is the latter component that is added to our second-step wage equation instead of the original dummy variables.
workers.
12 A similar pattern seems to hold in the second step for the composition of the workforce: whereas a large fraction of highly skilled foreign workers in a firm is beneficial for the wages of all their colleagues, a large share of unskilled foreign workers in a firm exercises downward pressure on all wages paid by the firm.
For comparison, a simple one-step estimation without firm-level variables (Model I) is given alongside the results of the two-step procedure. The model's adjustment to the data deteriorates markedly since it explains only 50.4 percent of the total variance (instead of 74.4 percent in the fixed-effect model). The omission of firm fixed effects yields biased estimates of the contribution of individual characteristics to wage inequality. This bias is particularly strong for the effect of gender and of work permits (interacted with skill levels). According to Model I, female workers receive 8.1 percent lower wage than equally skilled male workers. This individual difference reduces to 2.6 percent in Model II, the remainder being explained by firm-level segregation. Model I also predicts 18.9 percent higher wages for highly skilled foreign workers with an annual permit (compared to comparably skilled Swiss workers) and 12.5 percent lower wages for unskilled foreign workers with an annual permit. These differences are much smaller in Model II, suggesting that firm-level segregation may be responsible for most of this difference.
In order to get a clearer idea of the effects of segregation on wages, we calculate the marginal impact of the different groups' "over-exposure" on wages. 13 Recall that over-exposure of a population group is defined as the difference between the exposure rate of this group to other members of the same group and the population share of this group. Therefore, over-exposure can be interpreted as the change in the share of this group (in firms' workforce) if one moves from the work environment of the average worker in the economy to the work environment of the average member of that group. In order to satisfy the adding-up restriction of exposure rates, the other variables describing the structure of the workforce are reduced in a proportional manner.
An example will illustrate the procedure. Unskilled annual workers represent 2.1 percent of the total workforce in Switzerland. In the average work environment of these workers, the share of members of their own group is 14.3 percent and over-exposure is therefore equal to 12.2 percent. According to the estimates in Table 11 , this over-exposure diminishes wages by 9.2 percent. The proportional reduction of other population shares moderates this effect slightly, leading to a total wage reduction of 8.6 percent. Figure 1 illustrates these effects for all population groups. It is clear that firms with a high fraction of unskilled foreign workers (unless they hold settlement permits) pay lower wages than average. On the other hand, firms with a high share of skilled foreigners pay higher wages than average. Interestingly, the structure of the Swiss workforce in a firm has very little influence on wages.
A more complete account of the role of segregation can be obtained by calculating average log-wage differentials between different skill-nationality groups. The differences in average wages of Swiss and foreign workers, differentiated by work permit, are given in the lower part of Table 12 . Total wage differentials between Swiss workers and different types of foreign workers vary between 5.9 percent (cross-border workers) and 28.0 percent (seasonal / short-term permits). Segregation, as measured by the composition of the workforce, accounts for 20 to 35 percent of these differences in average wages. These aggregate decomposition results are however only of limited value as they do not reveal interesting structural features of the data.
As a first step towards a more disaggregated analysis, it is instructive to calculate Swissforeign wage differentials at different skill levels (see upper part of Table 12 ). Highly skilled foreigners with annual or settlement permits earn on average higher wages than comparatively skilled Swiss workers. Interestingly, the composition of the firms' workforce explains almost the entire wage differential between highly skilled workers (83 to 96 percent). 14 . At the other end of the skill distribution, the wage differential -which is always in favor of Swiss workers -is also explained primarily by segregation. Indeed, unskilled Swiss workers earn 6 to 18 percent higher wages than foreigners, and at least 62 percent of this differential can be attributed to the composition of the firm's workforce. Moreover, differences in firm size explain another 7 to 18 percent of the wage difference. We can therefore conclude that segregation at the firm level accounts for almost the entire wage differential between identically skilled Swiss and foreign workers.
Consider now wage differences between different skill levels. Our analysis of segregation revealed that segregation is stronger along the dimension of skill than according to the dimension of nationality. For Swiss workers, firm-level segregation by skill does not seem to have important consequences in terms of wages. The first part of Table 13 shows that the composition of a firm's workforce explains an extremely small fraction of the differences in wages between the three highest skill categories. Only unskilled Swiss workers seem to receive slightly lower wages because of firm-level segregation. Closer inspection of exposure rates and of the estimates of the wage equation reveals that this effect is due to the presence of a high fraction of foreign (rather than Swiss) unskilled workers in their firms. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers is greater for foreign than for Swiss workers; this difference seems to be explained mostly by segregation.
14 The fact that "discrimination" (in fact, the unexplained part of the wage difference) accounts for 25 to 30 percent of the wage gap can be linked to the observation that the estimated return to skill is higher for these categories of foreigners than for Swiss workers.
Our specification of the wage equation is restrictive in the sense that the impact of segregation on natives and on immigrants is assumed to be identical. In order to check whether this assumption determines our results, we estimate the wage equation separately for Swiss and for foreign workers. This procedure allows for a differential impact of the demographic and of the workforce composition variables. There are indeed some differences with respect to the coefficients of individual characteristics between the two groups. (...) Here we are particularly interested in the influence of the workforce composition variables. Figures 2 and 3 show the marginal impact of segregation on wages in the two equations; they are constructed in a similar way as Figure 1 . The impact of segregation does not seem to be fundamentally different for Swiss workers, on the one hand, and for foreign workers, on the other hand. There is one important exception: a high fraction of short-term or seasonal permits is detrimental for the wages of foreign workers but not for those of Swiss workers. (...) 
Conclusions

